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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

,J < >II X D. GJ_j y- K K,
I) I a i Jl t i / f

a nd ~ 11J1J e II a Jl t,

vs.
ItJ Ol~Il~ D()Cr_t.,OH~Il\X
J)l'BIX, aka ~lr\H.J()RIE
DOCrrOB~I . \X and J>Ij:~ERET
F.,EDJ 1~B1\L ~ ...\\'"I XU~ .:\XD
L< L\X 1\~SOCIATION,
a corporation,
lJcfeudants UJl(ll-lespondents.

~I~\

BRIEF < >F

Case No. 9388

DEFEXD.A_X'T-J~ESPOXDE~r_t.,

Lot :!-t, East ~I ill brook X o. :!, State of l tah, \Yas
arqnirf\d hy ~larjoriP Doctor1nan (then Dubin), herPinafter ('alled thP Dt•fendant and Dr. ~[artin F. Dubin, in
joint tenancy on .July :!:!, 1957. The do\vn pay1nent, in
T
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exce~H

of $10,500, ,,·as n1ade out of funds accuu1ulated
by Defendant prior to 1narriage to Dubin. (Response X o.
12, dated June 18, 1959, of Dr. ~lartin :B--,. Dubin to interrogatories, in file X o. 119467 and findings of fart in file
No. 123578.)

Defendant :\[arjorie Doctor1nan sued in separate
1naintenance against Dr. :\Jartin F. Dubin in cause K o.
119467 in the Salt Lake County District Court in Decemher 1958, and recorded a lis pendens setting forth that
:\Iarjorie Doctorrnan Dubin prayed for the property in
dispute under clai1n of right. :\lore than three n1onth:-5
later an a1aended co1nplaint in divorce on the grounds
of rruelty \Yas filed setting forth ~larjorie Doctor1nan
Dubin's principal outlay in the said property, her right
to it, and re<1uesting the Court to a\\Tard her all of Dr.
J[artin F. Dubin's right, title and intere~t in and to the
sa1ne.
Plaintiff in this action \Yas retained a.~ roun:sel for
Dr. l\1 artin F. Dubin, entPred his appearance a8 such, and
ans\\·ered the a1nended co1nplaint, also cro8s co1nplaining
for a divorce .
...:\ quit-rlaint deed \\·as dated and recorded Deceutber
7, 1959, in Salt Lake County, \Yith Dr. :\lartin }"~. Dubin
as grantor and John D. Ulynn as Grantee. (Exhibit Xo. 6)
On trial a pro1nissor~· notP dated Decentber 7, 1959 (Exhibit X o. ~) \rns pres en ted a~ partial consideration therefor, on \rhich 1>a~·111Pnt~ hPgan tTanuary 7, 19GO. ( Tr l~g 40,
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3
Ln -1-) 'The l'Plllaining ('on~1deration "\Yas perfor1ned l('gnl
~(' rvicP~.
1' l)g 3;), l.~n~ u-1:2; rrr Pg -±1, Ins ~--~--~9.)

cr

. .\fter ~ p.111. on Dece1nber 8, 1959, the Honorable
~\. H. Ellett disrnissed rau~e No. 119-!67 on his o\\·n Inotion \\·ithout prPjudice to tl!P rights of the parties and
\\·ith leave to proceed in anotllt'l' action (Exhibit Xo. 1).
Tlll' Court's reason "\Va~ that it lacked jurisdiction because the a1nended coulplaint in divorce related back
to the date of original filing in separate 1naintenance and,
therPfore, the three 1nonths l'(';..;ident requisite "\Ya~ not a
faet.
Prior, ho\\·ever, to the dis1nissal, ~Iarjorie Doctor1nan
Dubin filed a ne\\. action in divorce (order to sho'v cause
file X o. 1~3378, signed b~· ~\. li. Ellett, Judge at 1 :10 P.~l.
Dec. S, 1959) against Dr. ~Iartin F. Dubin, specifically
describing the property here involved, clairning her right
thereto and praying for distribution to her of the interest
therein of Dr . .Jiartin F. Dubin. Lis pendens "\Vas recorded at 1 :-!3 p.1n. (Exhibit No. 7).
Plaintiff herein, John D. Glynn, kne"\v prior to the
execution and deliYery to hiu1 of the December 7 deed
that the do"\vn payn1ent for this property "\vas made by
~Iarjorie Doctorrnan Dubin fro1n her separate estate
acquired prior to 1narriage to Dr. ~lartin F. Dubin ('Tr.
Pg. ;) 7, ln. 12: Tr. Pg. 38, In~. 10 and 18). He kne"\v that
payrnent~ ",.ere n1ade on the property fro1n the ~Pparate
funds of ~Iarjorie Doctor1nan Dubin; he kne\\. that cause~
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X o.i 119467 and 123578 \rere filed vraying distribution
of the interest of the subject proverty to her ( Tr. Pg.
50, Ins. 10 to botto1n of page; Exhibit X o. 9).
All thi ~ Glynn kne\v prior to the execution and delivery of the deeds to him.
A <1uit-claim deed dated Dece1nber 8, 1959, ,,·ith Dr.
~Iartin F. Dubin a~ grantor and John D. Glynn a8
(}rantee, conveying the ~ubject vroperty \\'"as recorded in
Salt Lake County, at 4:40 p.1n. It states for infor1national
purposes a promissory note in the sum of $5,000 payable
in $100 monthly in~talln1ents \\·as delivered by the grantee
to the grantor. Another docu1nent \\·as recorded purporting to be for infor1national purposes setting forth the said
note. The considerations for both deed~ \\'"ere the sa1ne,
the second deed being 111ade because Glynn ~ ~,rasn't sure
of the legality of the first doctnnent (Tr. Pg. 45, Ins. ·1bottoin of the page). The deed and note dated Dece1nber
8, 1959, \\rere executed and delivered on the 1norning of
Dece1nber 8, 1D39 (Tr. Pg. 46, ln. 21; Tr. Pg. 48~ ln. 10)
\Vhirh ,,·a~ prior to the dis1nissal \\·ithout prejudice of
cause No. 119467.
_.~\

dPcree ,,·a~ u1ade and entered in cau~l) X o. 1233/S
on J anuar~· :20, 1960, a~ folio\\·~: Plaintiff be, and she
hPreh~· i~~ a ,,·arded as her ~oll) and separate property,
free and cll)ar of any elai1n~ of the Dt)fendant, the follo\\Ting dP~eribed propPrty located in Nalt Lake ( ~ounty, State
of lTtah, to-\rit: I~ot 2-l-. Ea~t .:\1 illBrook X o. :2~ according
to thP offieinl plat~ of ~alt Lake County.·~
H
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The (~ourt in the instant case granted Plaintiff's
n1otion to dis1niss Plaintiff's con1plaint in partition and
ordered judgn1ent entered thereon, and further decreed
the quieting of cross con1plainant l\larjorie Doctoru1an '~
title in and to the subject property.

POINTS OF LA\\r
I. ALTHOUGH A COMPLAINT DOES NOT SET FORTH
ALL OF THE ALLEGATIONS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER 'THE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE STATU'TE, THE COURT lVIAY 'TAI{E SUCH EVIDENCE AS MAY
BE RELEVANT AND GRANT JUDGMENT THEREON.
II. IN AN ACTION FOR DIVORCE WHERE CERTAIN
PROPERTIES ARE SPECIFICALLY NAMED IN THE COMPLAINT AND TITLE THERETO SPECIFICALLY SOUGHT
BY EITHER OR BOTH OF THE PARTIES IN THE ACTION,
THEN THE SAID PROPERTY IS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF 'THE COURT, SUBJECT TO ITS ORDER AND
FREE FROM ANY PERSON CLAIMING THEREAFTER,
OTHER THAN A BONAFIDE HOLDER FOR VALUE; THAT
IS, ONE TAKING INNOCENTLY WITHOUT NO'TICE OF
THE ADVERSE CLAIM, AND PAYING AN ADEQUATE
CONSIDERATION.
III. LIS PENDENS GIVES NOTICE TO ALL THE
WORLD OF CLAIM IN THE PROPER'TY NAlVIED, AND ANY
PERSON TAKING SUBSEQUENT TO THE RECORDING OF
LIS PENDENS ·TAKES SUBJECT TO THE RIGHTS OF THE
P AR'TIES AS DETERMINED BY DECREE IN THE ACTION
NAMED.
THE EFFECT OF LIS PENDENS TO OPERATE AS
SUCH NOTICE EXTENDS BEYOND THE DISMISSAL
WITHOUT PREJUDICE OF AN ACTION AND CONTINUES
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AS NO·TICE TO ALL PARTIES TO AND THROUGH A SUBSEQUENT ACTION BROUGHT TO DETERl\IINE THE
MERITS OF THE ORIGINAL CAUSE.

ARG l,..JIEK'r
ALTHOUGH A COMPLAINT DOES NOT SET FORTH
ALL OF THE ALLEGATIONS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER ·THE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE STATU'TE, THE COURT l\1AY 'TAKE SUCH EVIDENCE AS l\'IAY
BE RELEVANT AND GRANT JUDGMENT THEREON.
I.

Rule 15 (b) of lTtah Rule~ of Civil I>rocedure,
A1nendn1ents to Confor1n to the Evidence. - \\11Pn i~:-;ues
not raised b~~ the pleadings are tried by express or inlplied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects a~ if they· had been raised in the pleadings. Such
ainendment of the pleadings as 1nay be nect}~sar~~ to
causP then1 to confor1n to the evidence and to raise tht·se
issues 1nay be n1ade upon 1notion of any party at any
tin1P, even after judg1nent; but failure so to a1nend does
not affect the result of the trial of these issues.
\Yhile l~espondent belieYe~ it has established a cause
undPr the fraudulPnt convPyance ~tatute, it is not our
purpose to be liu1ited to ~eeking relief through its uleditun.
It is not essential that respondent establish that

Dr. Dubin delivered this deed 'Yith the fraudulent intent
to dPprive his "'"if<' of her right:-;, hut rather to establish
that 0-l)'"nn "·n:-; not fre(\ of tht\ :-;u:-;pieion that Dr. Dnhin
aeted \Yith such a n1otivntion.
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II. IN AN ACTION FOR DIVORCE WHERE CERT.AlN
PROPERTIES ARE SPECIFICALLY NAMED IN THE COlVIPLAINT AND TITLE TI-IERETO SPECIFICALLY SOUGHT
BY EITHER OR BOTH OF THE PARTIES IN THE ACTION,
THEN TilE SAID PROPERTY IS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF 'THE COURT, SUBJECT TO ITS ORDER AND
FREE FROM ANY PERSON CLAIMING THEREAFTER,
OTHER THAN A BONAFIDE HOLDER FOR VALUE; THAT
IS, ONE TAKING INNOCENTLY WITHOUT NO'TICE OF
TilE ADVERSE CLAIM, AND PAYING AN ADEQUATE
CONSIDERATIO·N.

Runtsey c. R111nsey (l~ansas), 90 Pac. (2) 1093 is a
case aptly in point. The \vjfe sued husband for divorce
on July 30, 1937, and the husband and J. R. Harris to set
aside a deed. Incidental to and at the same time, the
Plaintiff levied an attaclnnent on the said land. Investor's
Royalty Co., a grantee of ,J. R. Harris, intervened.
The \vife's co1nplaint alleged the husband to be the
O\vner of certain land and petitioned that it be set aside
to her a.s alimony.
. . _.:\_ supple1nental petition alleging that after the comInenceinent of the action n1ineral deeds conveying the
subject land to Harris \Yere recorded and this was a
scheinl~ to defraud Plaintiff of her interests.
The intervenor clain1ed the transfer to Harris on
July 19 and to the1n August 3, 1937. On trial the intervenor::-; testified paying $2750 and \Yere a\Yare of the
status of the record ( attacl11nent and divorce file for
alimony.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Court stated: HThe record \Vas certainly sufficient to put an ordinarily prudent person upon inquir~r.
l"""nder the fact~ shovvn by the record it \vould be diffieult
for intervenor to ~ustain it~ eontention that it "·as an innocent purchaser for value ,,·ithout notice. But it i~ not
necessary to deterrnine the claiins of the intervenor on
these equitable grounds alone; any right title or interest
no\v asserted h~· intervenor \Va~ acquired \vhile the alirnony suit \va~ pending and undeter1nined."
Even 1norP succint]y the Court in WHken.soJl c. Elliot
43 l{an. 590, :2::3 Pac. Gl-±: '" \ Yhere the \vife files a petition
asking for divorce and ali1nony in ,,·hich ~hl~ definitely
deseribed real estate of husband and prays it be set
apart and decreed hers as per1nanent ali1nony, the doctrine of lis p~endens ,,·ill apply; any one \vho purcha~e~
such property during pendency of the action \vill be
bound hy the judg1nent subsequently tendered therein.

'" L'" nder thP lis pendens statute the interYenor \vas
charged \vith constructiYe notice of the rights of plaintiff;
frorn the record it is clear it also had actual notice. It
cannot no\\. co1nplain. ,,
The t"·o cases eited ahoYl deal \vith the proble1n of
specific propert~· \vhere the co1nplaints haYe requested
that thP properties bP sPt aside as ali1nony.
1

TltP subjeet ease and the follo"'"ing easPs deal speeil'ieall~·

,,·here Plaintiffs haYP specified the land, clai1ning
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the111 not lltPrel~·
claillt of right.

H:-\

per1nanent aliu1ony but

al~o

under

' >' >I.J fl]
1,. . , 0 '- 1~1, 1u~ ( >
' f
F ann 1. e
F, .
. • ) \~
-t,
I n .1/ o o r c u. ;r/ / 1•c ~ •).
.Zelie ~<·oda and Louis ~eoda took eertain property as
joint tenants in 19Ui. On .. \ ugust 1~, 19~7, Fannie filed
for divor<'P desc-ribing th<· :-\Hid propert~· and alleging she
had furni:-\hed thP pureha~<· price. ~he prayed that Scoda
be n:qui red to eonve~r thP :-\aid propert~· to her and for
an injunetion rPst raining hint fron1 encuu1bering and
di:-\posing the satnP. The suunnons and the injunction
\Vere not servl·d upon ~eoda until _..\ugust 30, 19~7. On
.. \ ugust ~0 the a ppellan fs~ ( ,,·ho like U lynn here, \Yer<·
counsel for ~coda in the divor<·e proceeding:-\) took judgInent h~· <·onf'L•:-\:-\ion against Scoda and levied Pxeeution
on ~<'oda~s share of the propert~·. On the ~hPriff's salP~
thP ap1>ellant~ bought for their judg1nent.
I,_) ' )

o_) ,

.J ('

..... ,

T

_..\ t trial the court held that Fannie had furnished

the pureluu.;e price and ordered Scoda to convp~· all of
hi:-\ right, title, and intere:-\t in lieu of ali1nony and in tl1<•
alternativP, hi:-\ lltastL·r in ehancery should 1nake the conveyance. ()n

~Ia~·

:>,

l~)~S,

1/:20 of the said property

Fannie

convp~·ed

an undivided

to .Jl ar~· .JI oore \Yho on the

31~t

of .Jfay, 1~):2~. filPd a :-\Uit for partition. ...-\ ppellants an:-\\\·ered adutitting having notice of the filing of the bill
for divor<·P. (In Illinoi:-\, by :-\tatutt\ the filing of a bill
of ron1plaint opera tPs to givP ron:-\trnctivo notiee of the
:'Uhjeet :'tated therein.) The (iourt deelared

a~

folio\\·:-\:
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~'It appears on taking te~tunony in thi~ action
chancellor found Fannie had paid 1none~~ and
he concluded a resulting trust arose for benefit
of "Tife-not\Yithstanding the rights and interests
of the parti(•s to this property had been disposed
of in the divorce decree \\·hich \Ya~ res adjudicata
as to all (1uestions raised in that proceeding.

"The principal question for revie\v herP is
\vhether the judgment for appellants secured . .\ugust 20, 1927, v. Loui~ Scoda \Yas lis pendens the
divorce proceedings-if it \Yas the a1H·llant here
are \Yithout title or interests and the circuit court
in the partition proceedings \Yas right in so decreeing.''
Fler suit .L-\ugust 1:2.
Judg1nent August :20.
Service August 30.
'~Under

that statute (lis pendens) fron1 the
date of filing of bill appellants and all others
had notice of pendency of the suit in equity affecting this real estate, and \\'"hateyer rights appellants
sought \\'Pre 1nade snl>jt et to the decree of tl1e
eourt in that ease. _._\ ppellants did not interYene
therein, although the record sho\\~s they filed notice of a 1notion to set aside the default against
Lous Seoda but apparently abandoned it.~,
1

The decree of tlu· circuit court in the diYoree proceeding i~ l'l'~ adjudicata of the right of FanniP Zelie to
the entire propPrt~~.

1:2:~

Appellant eitP~ Sun Jo.-ntrance C'on1pany r. Trhite,
l 1 19G, 3:-l Pae 90:2. I~espondent cites the sallll' easl'
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1n ~upport

of ltis prin('ipal ('Ollt(•ntion and di~tingui~he~
it fron1 tlH· ('<l~t· at har on tlH· follo\\·ing grounds. !)laintiff ~UP<l her husband for a divor(·e enuntl·rating par('el~
of eouununity prOIH·rty in hl}r contplaint. ~rhe subjl·('t
property lH·rt· ,,·as irH·ludl}d in the enu1neration. The
trial court found the subjl·<·t propPrty not to be coinmunity property but the private (•state of the husband. The
eourt dec n_•vd all of the eonnnunity propl}rty to the \\·ife
\rith leaVl' to fill• for a supplentental decree as hl}r needs
ntay detPrlninP. ~un In~uranee Contpany, although a\rare
of the status of this divor<·P procevding at all tintes, including kno\vledge of an ordPr to the effeet that the husband ~hould not alienate or PlH'Ulnber exeept in the ordinar~· pursuit~ of hi~ business, loaned 1noney on the said
\\·hich theY• atte1npted ultib b
l)l'Ol>PrtY. and took a Inorto·ao·p
1nately to forerlosl'. The suit here involves the deterntination of lien priority, either the \\·i fe's or the insurance
co1npany'~.

Thl} court holding \Ya~ to the effect that a po\\·er to
entPr supple1nental dp(•ree for ali1nony is not ~ueh a~ to
con~titutP a lien on all of the property of a hu~band,
and in snhstance her right~ against the property are no
better than those of a general creditor. Further, it ~ta t('d
approvingly as follows:
al~o,

in his treatise on J udgInent~ (~ertion 19G), after ~tating that the dortrinP
of li~ pendens i~ applirahlP only "·hen the ohjPc-t
of tlH· aetion i~ to affPet ~pc·eifie propert.v·, and
that the rulP~ pertaining thPrto havP no applicaH

:\lr. Freen1an,
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tion in a suit for divorce and ali1nony, unle~~ the
wife designates in her co1nplaint cPrtain specific
property \vhich she seeks to subject to her claim,
says : 'If the pleadings in a suit for divorce describe specific property, in resp(jct to \\'hich relief
i~ sought, either by 1naking it chargeable \\'ith the
payment of alimony, or setting it apart for the
use of, or as the property of, one of the partie~,
or of partitioning or dividing it bet\Yeen the1n,
the doctrines of lis pendens apply,' - citing in
support thereof some of the sa1ne authorities. But
the decisions in the cases cited by the appellant,
as well as those cited by .Jlr. Freeinan in support
of his statement, 'vill be found, upon exa1nination,
to have been Inade either by virtue of so1ne statutory provision, or upon the peculiar circun1stances
of the case before the court. In so1ne of the cases
the decision \Yas rendered upon the ground that
the complaint alleged that the property therein
described constituted all the property out of \Yhich
alimony could be recovered.''
It proceeds further to cite a
1~,

and

conclusive!~,

~eries

of

case~

colnplete-

supporting thP contPntion of the re-

spondent here.

Leu·is r. Le1cP,-..·, 210 Ga. 330, 80 SE :2nd 31:2 cited by
the a1>pellant also \\'e feel supports the respondenf8 case.
In this case the trial eourt nonsni ted the diYorced \Yife in
an action brought to cancel a deed frou1 her for1ner husband to his attorney of a house and lot \Yhich had been
a\\·arded to her and hPr childrPn in the diYorce proceed1ngs.
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()n

appPal this nonsuit \ras held to be Pl'ror

•• \rhen• it H!JlH'Hl'<'d that the propert:r had been
trnnsi'Prred to the attorneY
prior to tlu· brino·ino·
.
b
;-.
of the diYOl'('(' a('tion, out at a ti1ne \\·hen t}H• part ic•s \VP I'P sppa r<-lt Pd, the• agTPt•d <·on s i<lP ration hPing $500 as a f<·e for serYiees 1>:· the attorne:· in
brino·ino·
a divoi'<'P. action ao·ainst
the \\'ife ' and
;-.
b
h
'
a l>UrehasP-InonPY. notP of $700 ' too·(·ther
\\·ith the·
,.......,
asstunption of a loan against the property. TlH·
appellate court not(•d that the attorne:· had nevPr
SPPn tl1P propPrty· but aeePptPd the value of the
husband's Pquit:· in it on infor1nation given hin1
b:· the husband, and also knP\\. that the property
\ras oceupied h:· the \vife and her children, and
held that \vhetlH·r kno\vlPdgt• of thPse facts \\·as
suffieient to raisP a rPasona ble suspicion in tlu·
attorne:·'s 111ind that the husband's ohjt>et \\·as to
defeat the \vife 's possi bh· clain1 for alillH>n:· should
haYe he<'n subn1ittPd to thP ,jur:r. The court pointed out that evPn though the deed \ras 1nade upon
a valuahlP consideration, if the grantee had knowledge that it \\'as Blade u:· t}H• husband \\·ith the
intent to defraud his \rife, the jur:· \Vould bP authorized to canePl the deed.''
1~/iies l'.

Thies, 111 Xeh. 805,198 X\\T 131, citc·d by
the appellant is distinguishable fro1n the ea~e before thi~~
court

largel~·

on the scuue theor:· as that of the Sun In-

surance <·asP. In the r_rhiPs ease, an attorney took a
Blorto·ao·e
on a eertain I)iece of land, ,,·hile the divoree
h
h
action \\·as pending against thP hus hand. The \\·ife did
not join in thP 1nortgnge nor did she spPcify in the coinplaint thP sPtting aside to he·r of the subject land either
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as ~pecified alimony or under other per~onal clain1. The
<1uestion involved \\'as \vhether the 1nortgage \Va~ to prevail against a later rlairn for ali1nony and attorney's fees.
Appellant 1nakes further point on his behalf of Adanzson v. Adan1sou, 55 Utah 3-1--t, 188 J)ac. 635. Respondent feels this case should properly be cited for the respondent.
In this case several divorce proceedings had been
started by either the husband or the \vife in the period
between 1909 and 1916. In ~larch 191G, they O\\'Iled a
parcel of land valued at $2500. The parties \vere separated and the husband had been trying for so1netin1e to
sell this parcel of property. The \vife consistently refused to join in any conveyance \vith the husband. He
finally sold his one-half to his father for $1:250, ackno\rledged to be a fair value for the one-half of the land, on
terrns of $250 do\vn, $500 before the end of the year. and
the final $500 the follo\\Ting year. In 1917 this action in
divorce and to set aside the eonYeyance to the father \Ya~
instituted.
The plaintiff \\"rife rontended the conveyance "Tas
1nade to defraud her of her
taining the

right~

intPre~t.

The court, in sus-

of the father, declared as

folio\\~~:

"The testilnony in thi~ ea~e ~trangely tend~
to sho\\r defendant~ .1\<lan1~on ~Pnior~ purcha~ed
the propPrt~· in good faith~ and the tP~tinlony i~
quite conclu~ive that he paid for it all that it "-a~
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"·ortlt. 'rhP faet that t hP cunount paid \ras in in~talhnent i~ not <·onclu~iYP of fraud. ~\ t hP~t it only
rai~P~ a pr(l~Ulllption.''
III. LIS PENDENS GIVES NOTICE TO ALL TJ:-IE
\VORLD OF CLAil\I IN THE PROPER·TY NAMED, AND ANY
PERSON TAKING SUBSEQUEl\TT TO THE RECORDING OF
LIS PENDENS TAKES SUBJECT TO THE RIGHTS OF THE
PARTIES AS DETERMINED BY DECREE IN THE ACTION
NAMED.
THE EFFECT OF LIS PENDENS TO OPERATE AS
SUCH NOTICE EXTENDS BEYOND THE DISMISSAL
WITHOUT PREJUDICE OF AN ACTION AND CONTINUES
AS NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES TO AND THROUGH A SUBSEQUENT ACTION BROUGHT TO DETERMINE THE
l\IERITS OF THE ORIGINAL CAUSE.

ThP fir~t ~entl1 IH't 1 i~ ~o univer~all~· aeee1)tPd a:--;
la\\· it rt•quires no furtlu·r ~upport. The pffeet of a lis
pendens a~ adapted to the ca~P at bar is exhaustably di~
t·u~~ed in Goorf ...,·on eta! r. l.JeluHau, (N.(;.) 35 SE:2cl G:2:~,
16;) .:\LR. Z>lO. ln the (; oo<l~on action thtl plaintiff brought
~nit in July 19-!3 and reeonled a lis pPndc·ns ....\t thP tiinP
of trial dPf'Pndant~ de1nurred and Inoved for a nonsuit.
·rhe court overruled both and ulti1natel~· found for plaintiff~ on the i~~UP~. Defendants appealed and \Vere su~
tainecl on the appeal. 11 he appPllate opinion \Ya~ certified
to the trial court on or about DeePinber 3, 19-l-±. Th(l
judginPnt

19-!-J., the

'va~

Pntered J anuar~· 1;), 194-5. On DeceinlH_•r

defendant~

contP~ted

of the

in the

fir~t

h~·

Yi rtue

dPfPndant~

in this

aeti on, holding

deed, eonYeyecl to the

action.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
On January 13, 1945, the plaintiff~ in the foruHlr
proceedings brought a ne\Y action on the sa1ne cause seeking the same relief, alleging additionall~, that the defendants personally kne\Y all of the facts and also \Yertl purchas\\'er~ pendente lite on the old lis pendens. The defendant~ in the second action den1urred contending that
it appears on the face of the pleading that at the ti1ne
they took title the lis pendens \Yas in force since a judgInen t of reversal \\'as final, ending the cause and the
effectiveness of the notice of lis pendens, thereby giving
the1n the status of an innocent purchaser \\~ithout notict~.
The court gives two pages of reasons sustaining the
effertiveness of the lis pendens recorded in the fir~t action through the second cause but signifieantly adds the
following:
"'Et1ually derisiYP on the point, ho\vever, i~ thl
circu1nstance to \\'hich appellant~ ~ee111 to be inadvertent. It is that plaintiffs haYe not relied
solely on the original notice of li~ pendens, although they they haYP pleaded it but haYe alleged
that defendants had actual kno\\Tledge of plaintiff~
rights and equitieH in the land at thP ti1ne they
acquired title."
1

COXCLlTSIOX
Defendant-cro~s con1plainant i~ justifiably entitled

to thP relief granted hy the court. In the light of Judge
\Tan ( otfs ohserYntions \\'ith respl)ct to appellant, it is
1

eharit~,

to :say no 1nore about appellant·~ good faith.
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\\'"e fp(•l thP pffp(·t~ ol' li~ lH'lHh·n~ togethPr "?ith, or
apart fl'Olll thP fatt of' !>Pl'~Oll~d knO\VlPdg'P in thl• appellant~ thP f'aet of the pro1H·rt~· hPing in the juri~dietion
01' tltP (•ourt at all tilllP~ involVPd: and the signifieant
prin(·ipll• of l'P~ adjudieata of the clai1n~ of thP appellant
a~ sPttlPd in the ~eeond divorc(• aetion, arP COlllpelling of
no ot hP r eone 1u~ ion than that of ~u~ta in i ng tllP trial eourt.
If, ho\\·Pv(•r, tlH· court ~hould ~eP fit to rever~e dPei~ion
of trial courC it is ~uln11itted that thi~ cau~P 1nu~t be
ren1a1HlPd for further trial in that the Defendant-c-ross
co1nplainant ha~ hot .'·et had the opportunity to prl•sent
a defPn~P to plaintifr~ aetion in \\·hieh the llonorable
~\. 1-I. EllPtt is a \\?i tnP~s to tP~ti f.'? l·~~Pntially to the substance of the que~tion propounded to plaintiff U l.'?nn h.'?
J[r. DPan 'Conder on tran~eript pagP ;)-t, lines 7-10.
Respectfull.'· subn1itted,
Bl~RX 4\RD

L. ROSE

DE . \X E. CO~DER
.AJtoruey.-.,· for Respondent
53 E. -l-th
Salt

l_.~ake

~outh

City, l . . tah
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